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1. Introduction 
 
A conventional power system is characterised by large scale generation sources that 
inject large amounts of power into the transmission grid, which in turn is transported to 
passive distribution networks, and then delivered to the end-users. A key feature of the 
low-carbon future power systems is that they will perform in an operating environment 
and paradigm in which distributed generation (DG), demand response, and storage 
facilities are important components of the system (Soares et al., 2012). These resources 
are connected to low (and medium) voltage networks thus making the distribution grid a 
crucial element of sustainable electricity sectors of the future. These changes are driven 
by climate and sustainability policies along with affordability and reliability of 
electricity supply. Thus, the future power systems will be based on coexistence of 
conventional and distributed generation sources, and tap into demand response and 
storage as network resources for efficient planning and operation. 
The electricity distribution network operators (DNOs) are responsible for, expansion, 
reinforcement and maintaining the safety and reliability of the network to support power 
flows and ensure quality of supply. Integration of distributed resources2 introduces new 
challenges and opportunities that require innovative technical, economic and regulatory 
solutions to overcome the barriers and utilise possibilities. This includes enabling 
distributed resources to compete with alternatives in providing network and non-
network services to the DNOs. In the context of non-network solutions, there is an 
opportunity for replacing or deferring grid reinforcement by meeting demand locally 
through deployment of DGs, storage and reducing peak demand through demand 
response and energy efficiency3. In effect, due to potential benefits of distributed 
resources for the grid, especially at distribution level, they are natural alternatives to 
conventional network capacity enhancement (Sheikhi Fini et al., 2013). 
From an economic viewpoint, a challenge is how to value these alternative energy 
resources. At present, there are no established methods to value the complex set of 
technical and financial opportunities (and challenges) arises from the integration of 
these resources. This stems from the lack of a market mechanism that supports this 
process. Moreover, adopting distributed resources to defer demand driven grid 
reinforcement requires extending the traditional business model of distribution utilities 
in a consistent manner with the unbundled sector. Thus, along with technical concerns, 
there is a need for innovative economic and regulatory solutions. For example, issues 
such as ownership model of resource facility, differentiating between costs of capacity 
and energy, dispatchable and non-dispatchable generation, possibility of trade in other 
2 Throughout this paper we use the term “distributed resources” to refer to distributed generation, storage 
facilities and demand response (and energy efficiency) that interact with distribution network. 
3 Energy efficiency, as a permanent reduction in energy demand, is emerging as a resource in capacity 
markets along with behavioural (temporarily) demand response.  
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markets, managing storage and demand response are important and need to be 
addressed. Moreover, the presence of uncertainties such as the sustainability of costs 
and possibility of demand reduction over time constitute some risk elements. 
This paper proposes a three stage market-based approach termed as “contract for 
deferral scheme” (CDS) in order to employ an economically efficient portfolio of 
distributed generation, storage, demand response and energy efficiency to supply 
network capacity and to defer demand driven investments.  
The next section discusses the need for innovative network solutions and explores the 
previous studies on the effect of distributed resources on network investment deferral. 
An extended business model of distribution companies including the contract for 
deferral scheme has been introduced in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the details of 
CDS market model in three steps: pre-auction stage, auction stage and post-auction 
stage. Finally, the study concludes with Section 5. 
 
2. Demand Driven Network Investment 
 
A feature of the traditional approach to upgrading the network is that as demand grows 
gradually, network reinforcement is carried out in large increments requiring lumpy 
investments. As a result, a portion of grid capacity remains idle for long periods in 
anticipation that demand will eventually increase. Therefore, in a network reinforcement 
cycle, the total capital employed, to deliver a given amount of output, can be higher than 
the theoretical optimum needed at any given time. At the same time, due to adverse 
effect of asset utilisation rise on energy loss; the network utilities face a trade-off 
between the rate of asset utilisations and reducing network energy losses (Ofgem, 
2003). Figure 1 presents the demand growth path and a corresponding network capacity 
enhancement schedule. 𝐶𝑖 denotes the initial capacity and 𝐶𝑟 represents the added 
capacity as a result of reinforcement. 
Underutilisation of assets, in demand driven network investments, is exacerbated when 
the mid- or long term development of demand are uncertain. As demand grows, the 
output of network, for a given level of capacity, also increases. However, demand for 
electricity can also decline, in which case the idle capacity and consequently the 
operating cost of network, per unit of output, raises (Jamasb and Marantes, 2011). The 
case of an upward deviation of demand from projections is less critical for asset 
utilisation, as it is normally possible to carry out investment such that the shortages in 
network capacity can be avoided. 
An alternative to the traditional network enforcement is to meet part of the demand for 
energy services locally through DGs, storage and managing demand through demand 
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response and energy efficiency measures. This is to use distributed resources whether 
on the supply side (DGs and storage) or on the demand side (demand response and 
energy efficiency) to avert the need for lumpy investment in costly redundant 
transformers (Hemdan and Kurrat, 2011). These resources can be procured to meet the 
extra demand projection plus a reserve margin for contingencies. The advantages of 
distributed resources are not limited to the deferment of network reinforcement but also 
include, peak shaving, spinning reserve, voltage and frequency regulation, and dealing 
with variability of supply side (Zafirakis et al., 2013). 
From a regulatory perspective, integration of distributed resources as an alternative to 
conventional network reinforcement is in concert with the innovation incentives 
embedded in the regulatory frameworks of distribution companies. For example, in the 
UK, under the RIIO-ED1 regulatory model, innovative solutions are incentivised by 
rewarding the downward deviation from the expected capital expenditure in business 
plan of DNOs (Ofgem, 2012). These financial incentives play a pivotal role in directing 
the network companies towards implementing smart solutions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Demand growth and network capacity enhancement 
Source: Authors 
 
There is an extensive body of literatures that evaluates the effect of distributed resources 
on investment deferral of grid capacity, in particular with respect to integration of 
distributed generation. These studies explore different perspectives of this issue such as 
cost-benefit analysis, size, siting, type effect of generator and implication for regulatory 
model of network companies. 
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Pudaruth and Li (2007) investigate the costs and benefits of DG for investment deferral 
of distribution companies in terms of thermal capacity limits of lines and assets. 
Mendez et al. (2006) assess the medium and long term impact of DGs on investment 
deferral of radial distribution networks. The study demonstrates that after initial 
investment for connection of DGs, their net effect is to defer capacity enhancement 
driven by natural demand growth. They also show that the intensity of the effect 
depends on the type of distributed generation (e.g., wind power versus CHP).  
The effect of siting on investment deferral of distributed resources has been discussed in 
several studies. Gil and Joos (2006) find that the benefits are maximised, if DGs are 
sited at the end of long feeder and near load pockets because of their effect on energy 
losses and congestion reduction. Zhang et al. (2010) show that effective site reallocation 
will increase the benefits of capacity deferral for the same amount of DGs connected. 
Moreover, Wang et al. (2009) demonstrate that significant benefits, in terms of 
investment deferral, can be harnessed if the DG contribution to system security is taken 
into account. They also show that the deferment varies significantly with location and 
size of the generator. 
Although DGs are promising and reliable resources for investment deferral; this effect is 
not limited to these resources. In effect, storage facilities, demand response and energy 
efficiency are also potential resources that, along with DGs, can lead to grid investment 
deferral. Schroeder (2011) argue that demand side management and storage also 
constitute important tools in operation of distribution networks that could benefit system 
operation by avoiding capacity shortages. The study shows that, in the case of storage, 
for example, grid reinforcement can be avoided at some voltage level without harming 
system security because network capacity utilisation rate will remain well below the 
threshold. Also, the study noted that the effect of demand side management is stronger 
when more flexible demand, such as electric vehicles, is available.  
These studies show there exists an opportunity for taking the advantage of the synergy 
between investment in distributed resources and the obligation of network companies 
with respect to network reinforcement. However, the effect of these resources on grid 
depends on many factors such as location, technological specification and timing of 
investments (Vogel, 2009). An effective regulatory framework, thus, is required to align 
these benefits between resource developer and network companies. In the absence of 
such mechanism, penetration of these resources can, sometimes, lead to adverse effect 
on the network. For example, DGs uptake can expose the grid to induced energy losses 
when installed capacity exceeds the demand (Harrison et al., 2007). 
Distribution utilities can influence the siting of distributed energy resources such as 
DGs through connection and use-of-system charges (which could be based on their 
capacity and the sole-use network asset used) and reward when DG installation is in line 
with optimal operation of the network (Jamasb et al., 2005). The rewards can be 
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grounded on generator exported power at system peak, proximity to the frequently 
congested zones and the network asset utilised. The implication of DNOs’ preferences 
for size and location of DGs and the effect of regulatory model on optimal connection 
of DG within existing networks have been examined by Piccolo and Siano (2009). 
 
3. An Extended Business Model  
 
Integration of distributed resources to defer demand driven network investment requires 
both technical and economic changes to the current operational paradigm of distribution 
networks. From a technical perspective, network management needs to evolve from 
passive to active by using real time control and management of distributed resources 
and network equipment based on real time measurement of primary system parameters 
such as voltage and current (Zhang et al., 2009). From an economic perspective, the 
business model of distribution companies is required evolve and expand beyond the 
current only connection and use-of-system charges. The new economic and technical 
models will shift the operation of distribution companies from network operators 
(DNO) to distribution system operators (DSO). Figure 2 illustrates this paradigm shift. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The transition from DNO to DSO model 
Source: Authors 
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Currently, the revenue sources of distribution utilities have comprised of the regulated 
connection charges and use-of-system charges. Based on the type of consumer and 
regulatory framework model, new connection fees consist of shallow and deep cost 
charges (Jamasb et al., 2005). In an environment with high penetration of distributed 
resources the DSOs should be allowed to expand their revenue sources beyond 
provision of connections and energy transport charges only. This is because, over time, 
the presence of distributed energy resources close to the site of demand reduces the 
volume of energy transmitted in the grid and consequently, shrinks the revenue base of 
network companies (van Werven and Scheepers, 2005).  
The extended business model of DSO includes interaction with different consumer 
categories, transmission system operator (TSO), distributed energy operators and retail 
suppliers. DSO can offer certain services to these players that construct extra sources of 
revenue and receive certain services from them that will constitute part of its costs. 
These services will include local balancing in the distribution network, premium 
reliability for some commercial or industrial customers and also offering system data to 
the DGs operators and retail energy suppliers as DSO is the only party that have such 
information (van Werven and Scheepers, 2005). These will bring new stream of revenue 
for the DSOs which are not currently possible under the DNO business model.  
DSO will contribute to national load balancing and will be compensated for that by the 
TSO. This will be done through dispatchable DGs (and, where possible, storage and 
demand response resources) that are under the control of distribution system operators. 
Moreover, many commercial and industrial users need premium reliability as their 
production process is sensitive to the electricity input (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013). 
DSOs will be reimbursed by those industries for providing highly reliable connections. 
Furthermore, with the use of information and communication technologies, valuable 
system data will be available that can be shared with DG operators and retail suppliers 
for efficient planning and operation in return for a payoff.  
At the same time, the costs to DSO will include operation and maintenance, grid 
reinforcement (which can be either in a traditional approach or by procurement of 
distributed resources), acquisition of ancillary services from DGs and TSO, use of 
system charges and finally cost of energy losses. Figure 3, illustrates the existing and 
new services, flow of revenue, costs, and interaction of key players in an extended 
business model of DSO.  
An important part of the extended business model is the possibility to integrate 
distributed resources as alternatives to grid capacity enhancement. This however, 
requires an economic model that is consistent with the regulatory framework of an 
unbundled sector. Moreover, the model must allow the DSOs to procure these resources 
cost efficiently and ensure compliance by resource providers. The rest of the paper 
introduces a new approach that enables the DSOs to utilise this possibility. 
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Figure 3: The extended business model for DSO 
Source: Authors 
 
3.1 Contract for deferral scheme (CDS)  
A challenging task is to design of an economic model that delivers network service 
(network capacity) cost effectively using alternative resources (DGs, storage, demand 
response and energy efficiency). Provided the regulatory issue concerning the 
ownership of distributed resources by the network companies, under an unbundled 
power sector paradigm, our proposed model is based on a “contract for deferral scheme” 
(CDS). Under the CDS scheme, the DSOs can enter into contract with distributed 
generations, storage facilities operators, demand response and energy efficiency 
providers, which offer available capacity when needed. The market participants that 
enter a contract will be obliged to have available the required capacity at the time of 
network constraints (or upon being called). In return, the DSO offers them a capacity 
payment. The CDS contract acts as proxy for vertical integration and, at the same time, 
it is procured on a competitive basis. 
CDS is considerably different from both administrative and market based methods that 
have been introduced previously. CDS differs from the administrative approach 
proposed in Hof et al. (1996) which calculates a break-even price at which a distribution 
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company is indifferent between undertaking conventional reinforcement and alternative 
approach. This is because their approach does not achieve economic efficiency as it 
ignores market mechanisms and opportunity cost of scare resources to the society and 
hence, it is not welfare maximising. Furthermore, their administrative approach has only 
been discussed in the context of DG whereas CDS is a market-based approach for 
integration of a portfolio of distributed resources which are treated equally.  
CDS also differs from the market based approach proposed in Trebolle et al. (2010) 
termed as reliability options for distributed generation (RODG). Firstly, the CDS model 
takes into account the investment deferral effects from all types of distributed resources 
irrespective of being on the supply side (DG and storage) or demand side (demand 
response and energy efficiency) whereas the RODG model focuses on distributed 
generation only. Secondly, the auction structure proposed for RODG is based on a 
version of sealed bid auction which might not be suitable for acquisition of renewable 
resources (e.g., Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010). In contrast, the CDS contract is based on 
a model of descending clock auction (presented in the next section) used in some 
countries for capacity procurement and in particular for renewable resources acquisition 
(e.g., NYSERDA, 2004). Thirdly, the RODG model does not specify how this model 
fits into the wider business model of distribution utilities whereas CDS emerges out of 
an extended business model within the unbundled power sector paradigm.  
The advantages of the CDS approach can potentially go beyond investment deferral by 
providing value added benefits to the power system. For example, following the market 
deregulation and liberalisation, the reserve capacities of large scale power generation is 
declining in many countries (Gordijn and Akkermans, 2007). This creates new business 
opportunities for small scale distributed resources that could supply some system 
reserve. Additionally, CDS motivates investment in storage technologies which 
currently their uptake is sensitive to a range of uncertainties such as future resource mix, 
technology development, market structures and the uncertainty of returns (Grunewald et 
al., 2011). Moreover, CDS give a boost to the integration of demand response and 
energy efficiency, which are currently perceived to be underutilised resources because 
the electricity markets and reliability requirements have been designed for, and evolved 
under, a generator supply paradigm (Capper et al., 2012). 
In summary, CDS is a mechanism for procuring, on a non-discriminatory basis, a 
portfolio of capacity resources through a competitive forward auction process. The 
auctions can reveal the value of the product (capacity) and maximize the revenue 
obtained, if a sufficient number of non-colluding bidders participate (Newbery, 2003). 
The selected resource portfolio will act as a substitute for conventional demand driven 
network reinforcements.  
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4. CDS Procurement Procedure 
 
Procurement of CDS contracts, by DSO, needs to be based on a well-designed and 
implemented auction. Overall, the process of CDS contracts acquisition can be 
described in terms of three stages: pre-auction stage, auction stage and post-auction 
stage. In the pre-auction stage (stage one), eligibility of potential suppliers needs to be 
verified with respect to certain requirements. Stage two, is the implementation of 
auction and process of price discovery. Stage three (post-auction), corresponds to the 
signing and implementation of CDS contract. Figure 4 schematically illustrates the 
process of CDS contract procurement. 
 
4.1 Pre-auction stage 
In this stage the DSO forecasts demand growth over the subsequent years and projects 
the required network capacity. That is to identify the constrained zones and the locations 
which can potentially experience distribution bottleneck, for delivery to the consumers. 
DSO often investigates the load duration curve of distribution facilities to find out 
possible over-load condition and also assesses the grid reliability to ensure that a 
component failure will not cause a long term interruption (Trebolle et al., 2010). 
The major task at this stage, however, is to identify and evaluate resource suppliers. 
This means the DSO needs to initially decide which resources are eligible to submit 
offer. For example, the DSO needs to determine whether to allow only existing 
capacities or that both existing and new capacity providers can participate in the auction 
and also specifying type of resources.  
The resources that are eligible to participate in the auction can be different based on the 
feasibility, regulation and institutional framework as well as technical condition of 
power system. In the UK, the upcoming capacity auction is technology neutral and 
includes both the existing and new resources except those that are operating under 
contract for difference (CfD), feed-in-tariff or renewable obligation, and interconnected 
capacity (DECC, 2013)4.The eligible resources include traditional generation plants as 
well as demand response (behavioural demand reduction) and storage technologies.  
Furthermore, energy efficiency (permanent demand reduction through adoption of more 
efficient processes and appliances) is being considered for inclusion in this list. ISO 
New England and PJM forward capacity markets5 in the US, however, view energy 
efficiency as an eligible resource which can participate in the auction along with the 
4 This is to avoid overpayment because there are already under a form of capacity payment.  
5 ISO New England (ISO NE) market serves Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island and Vermont. PJM is Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection. 
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other resources (Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010). Nevertheless, energy efficiency is 
treated differently in these markets. PJM allows energy efficiency to receive capacity 
payment, up to four years of their measured life, whereas ISO NE remunerate for its full 
measured life to encourage long-lived energy efficiency assets (Gottstein and Schwartz, 
2010).  
 
 
Figure 4: The procedure of CDS contract procurement 
Source: Author 
 
As the CDS contract aims to attract new investment in distributed resources, eligible 
bidders should be selected from both existing and new capacity providers, in a non-
discriminatory and technology neutral manner. This will include, distributed generation, 
storage facilities, demand response and energy efficiency.  
Depending on the nature of resources connected to the distribution network, the feasible 
options for CDS auction are: dispatchable distributed generations (e.g., CHPs), fairly 
electricity intensive and electricity dependent consumers (industrial and commercial 
consumers) which might be able to provide demand response and/or energy efficiency, 
and also storage facilities operators. Moreover, the DSO can set a minimum eligible 
volume of capacity to make the participation of small resources (e.g., residential 
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consumers, small back-up generations, and small storages such as PHEVs’ battery) 
possible only through an aggregator. 
A DSO might allow intermittent resources such as wind and solar power to participate. 
However, these need to be treated differently due to their stochastic nature of outputs. 
For example, the DSO may need to exclude the intermittent resources from availability 
penalties and/or the poor performing as this is beyond the control of the resource 
provider. DSO can establish the value for winter and summer qualified capacity of 
intermittent resources such as wind based on the methods that have been developed for 
this purpose. One approach that has been studied for ISO NE forward capacity market is 
to identify the set of reliable hours that deliver the most reliable estimator of median 
generation during the system peak (IRWGM, 2006). PJM capacity market, however, 
adopts a different method by applying a 13 percent reduction factor on peak capacity of 
wind intermittent resources (Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010). 
Therefore, CDS can take the advantages of all available resources whether on supply 
side or demand side including those with stochastic output. Particularly, participation of 
demand side resources (demand response and energy efficiency) along with supply 
resources (distributed generation and storage) can significantly improve efficiency of 
CDS acquisition. The evidence from ISO NE first capacity auction demonstrates that 
participation of demand side resources saved rate payers $24 million by making the 
market clearing price lower than it would have been otherwise (Jenkins et al., 2009)6 . 
Additionally, demand side resources are carbon free and thus, in harmony with 
environmental policies. Furthermore, they improve system reliability by relieving the 
load at congested circuits and also reduce market power of supply side resources in 
determining market clearing price.  
Following the initial identification of potential bidders, the DSO needs to verify the 
eligibility of resources providers with respect to conditions such as financial ability of 
new capacity providers, environmental compliance, siting and grid access etc. Below 
are the most relevant conditions which need to be verified before potential suppliers 
enter into the auction stage. The DSO  
i) should ask for supply of financial assurance, by potential bidder, in case of a 
new resource which needs to be constructed.  
ii) should demand potential bidders for submission of relevant environmental 
compliance documents as specified by the regulator for each type of 
generation technology. 
6 The ISO NE accounts DG as a demand side resource as well thus, in practice, the total saving from pure 
demand resources (demand response and energy efficiency) can be lower than this amount. Demand side 
resources (inclusive of DG in the case of ISO NE) made 2554 MW of 39142MW of offered capacity in 
the first auction (Jenkins et al., 2009). 
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iii) should investigate the siting of distributed resource and grid access condition 
especially for new resources. For example, position of resource with respect 
to frequently congested circuits and cost of grid connection. 
iv) should ask for submission of relevant documents, in the case of new 
resources, that indicates local communities living at development proximity 
are content. 
v) can ask for proof of technical expertise and managerial capability of resource 
provider. 
Potential suppliers that are qualified in terms of type and capacity volume and also meet 
the aforementioned criterions will be invited to submit their bids. In order to help the 
auctioneer to choose the starting price, the DSO might include other requirements in 
this stage such as rendering an indicative bid (the approximate quantity of supply and 
price). 
 
4.2 Auction stage  
Several different auction designs can potentially be employed in this stage. These 
include: sealed bid, descending clock auction, hybrid, combinatorial and two-sided 
designs (Maurer and Barroso, 2011). Sealed bid auction can be in the form of uniform 
pricing, pay-as-bid or generalised Vickrey style in which the winner pays the social 
opportunity cost of the item won (Fabra et al., 2002). In the combinatorial auction, 
auctioneer sells multiple goods simultaneously where bidders are only allowed to place 
a bid on bundle of items and not the individual items. A two-sided auction allows both 
bid and ask so as to deal with multiple sellers and buyers at the same time and is proved 
to be effective in reducing market power when there are few seller and many elastic 
demands (Zou, 2009). Descending clock auction, on the other hand, is a dynamic 
simultaneous multi-round Dutch auction in which bidders submit quantity supplied at 
each price until no excess supply exists (Rego, 2013). Hybrid auction is the combination 
of different auction forms.  
As the CDS contract acquisition is a form of single buyer model (i.e., DSO as the sole 
emptor deals with many potential suppliers), descending clock auction is the method of 
choice because of appropriate market characteristic. These characteristics, which are 
noted in NYSERDA (2004), make the descending clock auction a suitable approach for 
the CDS contract procurement. Firstly, it is an open auction with uniform pricing that 
discovers price with transparency and improves investment efficiency. Secondly, this 
auction only identifies the least cost suppliers as inefficient suppliers will withdraw 
from the auction when the clock ticks down (i.e., price starts to fall). Thirdly, this type 
of auction determines the winner in a simple manner and averts the need for complex 
comparisons of competitors’ bids which, in turn, reduces the probability of subsequent 
disputes. Fourthly, under this auction both price and quantity of capacity committed are 
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known at the end of the auction which allows the DSO to project more accurately future 
financial obligation as the result of CDS contacts acquisition.  
Descending clock auction has previously been used successfully in various public and 
private procurement contexts7. In the power market, this approach is used for 
procurement of renewable portfolio standard by New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority (NYSERDA, 2004). Moreover, ISO New England’s Capacity 
Market uses a descending clock auction in which, energy efficiency, demand response, 
and distributed generation compete for capacity contract on an equivalent basis 
(Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010).  
The DSO will execute a descending clock auction in multiple rounds with the following 
procedure. In the first round the auctioneer (DSO in this case) begins with a “starting 
price” (𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡) which is a fairly high price. The DSO can use information obtained 
during pre-auction stage such as indicative bid and breakeven price to choose the 
starting price. The resource suppliers, have some time (often between a quarter to few 
hours) to bid for the quantity of capacity they are willing to supply at this price. Then, 
the DSO adds up all the committed quantities and compares these with required network 
capacity to estimate the excess capacity.  
In the second round the DSO reduces the price and allows resource providers to bid 
again for capacity they are willing to supply at the new price. The new quantity will be 
lower, or the same as before (but not larger), because of the lower price compared with 
the previous round. If the excess capacity reaches zero, the auction terminates and the 
winners will be the suppliers that placed a bid in the last successful auction round will 
win. However, if the excess capacity is still not zero, the DSO will continue the auction 
over subsequent series until excess capacity is eliminated8. The winning suppliers 
receive the last price cleared by auctioneer. Figure 5 illustrates the procedure of a 
descending clock auction. 
The descending clock auction is an effective process for price discovery compared with 
the sealed bid auctions. Moreover, the dynamic nature of the auction allows the bidders 
to continuously adjust their bids based on the information revealed during the auction so 
that they can reduce the so called “wining curse”. Although the descending clock 
auction appears to be more complicated than the sealed bid auctions however, the past 
experience shows that it is not difficult to implement and also, the practitioners are more 
in favour of this model (Maurer and Barroso, 2011). However, the main weakness of the 
descending clock auction is that it increases the possibility of collusion among the 
7 Descending clock auction has been used in US, Spain, Columbia, and the reverse form of it (ascending 
clock auction in which auctioneer sells) has been adopted in France, Spain, US and Canada (Maurer and 
Barroso, 2011). 
8 If in round 𝑛 the committed capacity fall short of demand then auctioneer announce the price in round 
𝑛 − 1 as the market clearing price and allocate demand among successful bidders pro rata. 
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bidders under the condition of weak competition. The case of insufficient competition is 
addressed in Section 4.2.3.  
 
 
Figure 5: The descending clock auction 
Source: Authors 
 
4.2.1 Auction rules  
In order to conduct the CDS auctions in an effective and efficient manner, a number of 
rules need to be in place. These rules need to be transparent and known to all 
participants as they embrace the conditions to run the auction. The main auction rules, 
in the context of CDS procurement, are outlined in the following. 
i) The rule concerning the information to be released at the end of each round 
(e.g., whether or not participants can see the bids submitted by other 
bidders).  
ii) Withdrawal and re-entering in a multi-round auction (e.g., whether the 
winners must participate in all rounds of auction). 
iii) The incremental quantity of price decline in each round (e.g. this can be 
specified as a constant or as an interval).  
iv) Whether a bid can be modified after it is submitted. 
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v) The format of bid submission such as bidding on an electronic platform 
provided by the auctioneer or in a different form. 
vi) The “bidding window” of the auction (i.e. specifying when the bidding 
round starts and ends). 
vii) The minimum volume of capacity that supplier can bid in each round. This is 
to prevent inefficient bids and to allow aggregators to take part on behalf of 
many small scale storages and demand response providers.  
viii) Indication of minimum price at which the bidder would be willing to commit 
supplying capacity in the round that bidder has withdrew. 
ix) Rules concerning disqualification of bidders and allowing the auctioneer to 
remove a bid from the current or future submission.  
 
 
4.2.2 Auction lead time 
The time of the auction depends on several factors such as the prediction of demand 
growth in distribution network and the presence of new resources in the auction and 
their associated technology. The DSO will determine the lead time that new projects 
need to be completed and hence, fulfil their obligation for supplying capacity. However, 
if the bidders are existing resources only, the lead time will be shorter (e.g., the 
following year). Therefore, taking into consideration the different lead times for existing 
and new projects, the auction needs to be held well in advance of demand growth to 
allow sufficient time for the construction of new capacity if required.  
A short lead time can become a problem for capacity market design as it deters new 
entry even with high prices. A short lead time might also incentivise resource providers 
to withhold strategically in order to raise the price. The decision to run the UK capacity 
market with a four-year lead time between auctioning time and delivery period is to 
mitigate the impact of withholding and make the market sufficiently contestable by 
attracting new investment (see DECC, 2012).  
In the context of CDS auctions, the lead time should be based on the gestation period of 
energy-based distributed resources such as CHP plants or storage facilities which are 
often shorter compared with conventional power plants (e.g., coal or nuclear plants). 
Also, DSO can differentiate between existing and new resources to prevent a long lead 
time come at the cost of undervaluing the investment of existing resources. Moreover, 
specifying different delivery periods will facilitate the participation of demand response 
as they will not be constrained by the lead time of constructing projects. 
4.2.3 Inadequate supply and weak competition 
In CDS contracts, the issue of inadequate supply can occur if at the starting price, in the 
descending clock auction, the total capacity offered (by existing distributed generation, 
storage facilities, demand response and energy efficiency) is less than the network 
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capacity demanded. Insufficient competition, on the other hand, occurs when the 
number of bidders is limited (this can be accompanied with inadequate supply as well, 
though not necessarily).  
The issue of inadequate supply due to insufficient existing resources can be alleviated 
by changing the auction parameters such as price and lead time. One approach to 
modify descending clock auction is to differentiate between existing and new resources 
based on the price. For instance, allowing existing resources to have market clearing 
price but the new resources to collect the penultimate round price in the first year of 
delivery and market clearing price thereafter (i.e., if the market clears after 𝑛 round; this 
corresponds to the price in round 𝑛 − 1 and since the auction is descending in price we 
always have 𝑃𝑛−1 > 𝑃𝑛). This approach provides incentive for new resources to 
participate and thus, attracts more new developers into competition and can potentially 
reduce probability of inadequate supply. The discriminatory price descending clock 
auction can be accompanied with a suitable lead time to incentivise investors.  
The second approach to address the issue of inadequate supply is to include the amount 
of inadequate supply in the subsequent reconfiguration auction to correct for the 
inadequacy. This auction will cover both inadequate supply and change in the position 
of potential suppliers due to unpredicted circumstances. The reconfiguration auction has 
been explained in Section 4.3.  
As mentioned previously, the descending clock auction is vulnerable to weak 
competition. That is the bidders can misuse the available information during the auction 
to coordinate their actions and raise the market clearing price. One approach to address 
the issue of weak competition is to carry out a hybrid auction in which the first phase 
starts with a descending clock auction followed by a sealed bid auction. The advantage 
of this approach is that it attracts more of small bidders and hence, strengthens 
competition. This form of hybrid auction has been used in Brazil to auction hydro 
power resources and has proved to be effective, to some extent, in handling market 
power and weak competition (Maurer and Barroso, 2011). However, a weakness of 
hybrid auction is that it can increase complexity of auction process and raises 
transaction cost. Therefore, it can be difficult to implement a hybrid auction.  
Another approach, to address the market power, would be to use a single round sealed 
bid auction. Herrera-Dappe (2013) demonstrate that a sequence of two uniform price 
auctions gives lower expected revenue than a single uniform price auction when the 
market is not sufficiently competitive.  
Despite these possible remedies, under insufficient competition, the DSO might seek 
permission from regulator not to run an auction. In this case the DSO can adopt 
alternative approaches to procure capacity which have been suggested to developing 
countries in these circumstances. Some of these alternatives are: negotiations between 
the DSO and potential suppliers, using an administratively set price such as feed-in 
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tariff on a first-come-first served basis until the demand is met, or using a “beauty 
contest form of allocation” in the sense that DSO defines the criteria and conditions for 
contract with some room for discretion and subjective evaluation (Maurer and Barroso, 
2011). 
 
4.2.4 Market monitoring 
A competitive process can result in an undesirable outcome, if it is not appropriately 
designed, implemented and monitored. There are a number of potential obstacles such 
as liquidity, market power, collusion, gaming etc., from which the CDS auction is not 
necessarily immune. These highlight the need for oversight. Therefore, regulator needs 
to appoint a third party, as the auction monitor, to superintend the CDS acquisition 
process.  
The task of the auction monitor is to oversee the procurement process and report any 
evidence of breach of rule or non-conformity to the regulatory body. This includes all 
the stages from pre-auction to post-auction phase. The market monitor identifies the 
structural deficiency of CDS market design and the way these deficiencies can be 
misused by market participants. Moreover, the market monitor provides regulator with 
an assessment of market outcome to ensure they are consistent with a competitive 
process and policy objectives. Furthermore, the regulatory body can consult with the 
auction monitor in case that the conduct of the auction is disputed by a bidder. 
The auction monitor can also help with designing the auction procedure for the specific 
contract procurement. However, the tasks of auction design and auction auditing should 
ideally be delegated to two independent entities, as in the case of PJM capacity market, 
to reduce possibility of conflict of interest and increase transparency.  
 
4.3 Post-auction stage: Awarding CDS contract 
Following the acceptance of offers and clearing price, DSO will enter into CDS 
contracts with successful bidders. According to the CDS contract, the capacity supplier 
will be paid based on the price in the agreement and the resource operator is obliged to 
deliver capacity or to reduce demand when called by the DSO. As CDS is a contract, 
many of the relevant issues in the context of contracts theory (i.e., principal-agent 
relationship such as information asymmetry, moral hazard etc.), are also applicable to 
CDS. Moreover, in practice writing a complete contract (taking all contingencies into 
consideration) for CDS is both unfeasible and costly. However, the following important 
issues need to be elucidated in a CDS contract.  
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4.3.1 Length of CDS contract 
An important feature of the CDS contracts is the duration of agreement between DSO 
and capacity provider. Short agreements have the advantage that they are more easily 
tradable in a secondary market and also there is no long term financial obligation for 
DSO. However, long term agreement gives more financial security to capacity providers 
and avoids boom and bust in capacity market. In practice, a uniform contract length for 
all resources is not feasible, given the different cost structures, technology and asset age 
of capacity resources. Thus, in order to encourage investments and reduce the risk to 
investments, the DSO needs to differentiate between the existing resources and new 
capacities. It may be preferable to give more time to new capacities because a longer 
term agreement will enhance the certainty of return to investment and reduce the cost of 
capital. 
A possible risk of differentiating between the existing and new capacities is that the 
projects that are under construction at the time of the auction will be treated as existing 
resources. This creates incentive for investors to withhold new investments until an 
auction is announced. In order to mitigate this effect, the definition of existing and new 
resources should be based on the capability to deliver at the time of the auction so as to 
treat only those resources that are operational as existing resources. 
 
4.3.2 Prioritisation of support 
Under the CDS contracts, resource operator, DSO and TSO are the entities that will 
have control over the operational status of distributed resource. In order to improve 
coordination among these players and avoid conflict of interest, prioritisation of support 
needs to be clearly determined. The form of allocating priority can be based on the type 
of resource and the initial purpose of developing the resource. For example, if the 
resource is a DG which was originally installed to satisfy the developers’ own demand, 
a feasible arrangement would be to give the owners of DG resources priority because it 
is usually needed as backup power supply. The DSO would then be the second entity 
that has priority to call the generation for local balancing as no other alternative is 
available, and finally the TSO is the third entity. Where the resource output is not 
required locally or nationally, the energy produced can be sold into the wider electricity 
market.  
 
4.3.3 Non-compliance risks 
There are several sources of non-compliance risks such as the failure of successful 
bidder to sign the CDS contract, failure to complete the project (for new resources), 
risks related to the delays and failure of supplier to deliver the committed capacity, risk 
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of underbidding and finally regulatory and administrative risks. As in other contracts, 
the CDS needs to address these issues at an appropriate stage. For example, the risk of 
delay and underbidding can be reduced by applying stringent compliance rules. 
Frequent monitoring of project development can reduce the risk of failure with respect 
to construction of new resources. Moreover, strict qualification checks at pre-auction 
stage reduce regulatory and administrative risks such as those related to the project 
siting, grid connection and environmental obligations.  
A challenging issue from the perspective of the DSO is the commitment of the capacity 
provider to deliver when needed. Uncertainty in this will undermine the effectiveness of 
smart solution as alternative to grid capacity enhancement. Therefore, the DSO needs to 
ensure that a credible, effective enforcement and compliance mechanism is in place that 
guarantees a timely delivery and applies a penalty in the event of non-compliance. 
Drawing on the experience from the established capacity markets, there is a spectrum of 
approaches to reduce probability of non-compliance. The market-based methods rest at 
one end and the administrative approaches are located at the other end of the spectrum. 
The hybrid methods lay somewhere in between. 
One market based approach is to pin the terms of CDS contracts to some reference 
electricity market such that when the reference price is above the contract price, the 
resource operator is required to pay the difference. This incentivises the resource 
owners to deliver at the time of network constraint and peak demand, because even if 
they do not operate they still need to pay the difference. The price spikes usually 
coincide with time of peak demand and network constraints. However, if they do not 
coincide this method can be problematic. Moreover, in some countries such a market 
might not be available to provide a reference price.  
The administrative approach would be that the resource owners receive a capacity 
payment for their availability period, as specified in CDS contract, and to be penalised 
based on an administratively set price if they fail to deliver when they are called or fail a 
spot check by DSO. This method is more straightforward and easier to be implemented. 
However, the total annual penalties should be capped to avoid unquantifiable risk to the 
investors. For example, the penalty could be proportional to the volume of capacity 
(e.g., a percentage of the annual payment for that resource during the capacity 
commitment period). Moreover, the DSO should offer the option to resource provider to 
default on its commitment, when called, and pay the penalty if unexpected faults 
developed. 
The compliance monitoring approach that the DSO can adopt is context bounded. 
However, regardless of the approach chosen; it needs to take into consideration several 
aspects, such as the possibility of strategic behaviour and gaming the DSO, allowing for 
maintenance planning of energy-based resources, and linking the size of penalties to 
total volume of capacity payment etc. Moreover, in many capacity markets the penalty 
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price is not uniform across different resources. For example, the PJM and ISO NE 
capacity markets differentiate between supply side resources and demand side resources 
for non-compliance and associated penalties (Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010). This 
differentiation can also be helpful in the context of CDS contract given different nature 
of energy based and non-energy based resources.  
 
4.3.4 Reconfiguration auction 
Due to the possibility of unpredictable circumstances and change in economic factors, 
there might be discrepancies between the contractual obligation of bidders and the 
actual cost of their contract fulfilment. Thus, when there is evidence of such condition, a 
reconfiguration auction should be held in an appropriate time, ex-post, in order to allow 
suppliers to correct for these differences. For example, the ISO New England’s capacity 
market runs monthly and yearly reconfiguration auction to allow deficient supplier to 
procure replacement capacity (Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010). The lack of such a 
mechanism increases probability of unavailability of resource in the time of need. 
Other situations that require reconfiguration auction include the state of inadequate or 
excess supply of capacity. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3., the inadequate supply 
dominates when there is insufficient supply from the existing capacities at the first 
round of the descending clock auction. The excess supply can prevail when there is a 
decrease in load forecast9 following the auction and capacity acquisition. Under these 
conditions, the reconfiguration auction can help the DSO to buy or to sell CDS contracts 
and match supply with demand more accurately. The reconfiguration auction, for a 
specific target, can be held close to the year of delivery. The price in the reconfiguration 
option can be higher or lower than the initial CDS auctions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The power sector is evolving with anticipation of increase in penetration of distributed 
generation, storage technologies and demand side participation. Distribution networks 
which were originally designed as passive and one way transporters of electrical energy 
are entering a new era in which operational philosophy will change to the bi-directional 
power flows and the use of information and communication technologies. These will 
bring new opportunities for implementing innovative solutions for traditional issues 
such as demand driven network reinforcement, through locally satisfying of demand, 
using distributed resources.  
9 The error in forecast is natural when looking far into the future i.e. the CDS auction has been held few 
years in advance of delivery period. 
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This paper proposed a new market-based model termed “contract for deferral scheme” 
(CDS) to integrate an economically efficient portfolio of distributed resources including 
distributed generations, storage technologies, demand response and energy efficiency, 
as an alternative for demand driven network investment. The concept of CDS is 
consistent with an unbundled power sector paradigm, and lies within the wider context 
of an extended business model of distribution utilities. The details of the CDS 
procurement was discussed in three stages: pre-auction, auction and post-auction. Pre-
auction stage explored the conditions for resource eligibility; the auction stage discussed 
the process of price discovery and market rules and finally post-auction stage addressed 
issues such as the length of contracts and compliance monitoring. 
The CDS contracts present several potential advantages. Firstly, they protect the 
developers of distributed resources from market risks, decrease the financing cost and 
improve commercial bankability of investments. Secondly, they improve competition, 
encourage investments and hence; speed up the deployment of DGs, storage facilities 
and demand side participation. Thirdly, CDS auctions help with creating an integrated 
market for substitution of a resource portfolio as a virtual network capacity, at 
distribution level, and simplifying the process of valuing alternative solutions to grid 
reinforcements. Fourthly, CDS helps, to some extent, alleviating the gradual reduction 
of reserve margin which is currently a major issue in the post-liberalisation power 
sector.  
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